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INTRODUCTION
In 1966, the California Supreme Court rendered its decision
in Kellett v. Superior Court.' This decision had a dramatic effect
upon the pleading practices of prosecutions in California; it
defined how and when a defendant should be charged with a
misdemeanor when the defendant is charged also with a felony
which was committed at the same time as the misdemeanor.
Kellett's affect on the criminal pleading practice resulted from the
court's harmonizing of certain sections of the California Penal
Code.
Though few prosecutors, defense attorneys and trial judges
were excited by the result reached in Kellett, many were startled
by the interpretation which the court gave to the relevant sections,
and with the direction that misdemeanors-in any type of case-or
under any circumstances-be joined as separate counts with
felony charges in the superior court.
Several years have passed since the Kellett decision was
rendered. Nevertheless, it has been this writer's experience that
both real and hypothetical questions are still presented from the
prosecution's attempt to follow the teachings of this case. It will
be the purpose of this article to analyze and explore the theory
and practice of joining misdemeanors with felonies in complaints
before magistrates, in informations, and in indictments.
PART I. KELLETT V. SUPERIOR COURT
A. The Decision
Arriving in answer to a reported disturbance, the police
observed the defendant standing on a public sidewalk with a pistol
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1. 63 Cal. 2d 822,409 P.2d 206 48 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1966).
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in his hand and arrested him. The same day he was charged with
a violation of section 4172 (exhibiting a firearm in a threatening
manner), a misdemeanor offense. Approximately a month later,
while his misdemeanor charge was pending in municipal court,
and apparently after a felony complaint had been filed, a
preliminary hearing was conducted, wherein it appeared that the
defendant had a prior felony conviction. As a consequence, he was
ordered by the magistrate to appear in superior court to answer
an information which was filed charging him with a violation of
section 12 02 13 (possession of a concealable weapon by a person
who has been convicted of a felony), a felony offense. While he
was awaiting trial on his felony charge in superior court, the
defendant pled guilty in municipal court to a charge of exhibiting
a firearm in a threatening manner, and was sentenced to 90 days
in the county jail. Six days after his misdemeanor conviction and
sentence, the defendant appeared in superior court and moved to
dismiss his pending felony charge on the ground that it was barred
by section 654.1 The California Supreme Court, in a unanimous
opinion, upheld the defendant's contention, observing:
By a series of amendments to section 954 that have greatly
expanded the scope of permissible joinder, the legislature has
demonstrated its purpose to require joinder of related offenses
in a single prosecution.
If needless harassment and the waste of public funds are
to be avoided, some acts that are divisible for the purpose of
punishment must be regarded as being too interrelated to
permit their being prosecuted successively. When there is a
course of conduct involving several physical acts, the actor's
intent or objective and the number of victims involved, which
are crucial in determining the permissible punishment, may be
immaterial when successive prosecutions are attempted.
When, as here, the prosecution is or should be aware of
more than one offense in which the same act or course of
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 417 (West 1955).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021 (West 1956).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (Vest 1955). This section states in part:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different
provisions of this Code may be punished under either of such provisions, but
in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction




conduct plays a significant part, all such offenses must be
prosecuted in a single proceeding unless joinder is prohibited
or severance permitted for good cause. Failure to unite all such
offenses will result in a bar to subsequent prosecution of any
offense omitted if the initial proceedings culminate in either
acquittal or conviction and sentence.5
B. Analysis
The law prior to Kellett was generally understood to prohibit
joining a misdemeanor charge as a separate count in an
indictment that alleged a felony charge and was filed in superior
court. This was the position of People b. Rodriquez,' which
concluded that if both misdemeanor and felony charges were to
be prosecuted, it may only be accomplished by successive trials,
the misdemeanor in municipal court, the felony in superior court.
This decision was reached despite the contrary holding of an
earlier case, People v. Bundte.7 Bundte stated that misdemeanors
and felonies could be united, provided they grew out of the same
transaction, or series of transactions which were corollary in
nature. Now, Kellett teaches that the joinder of a misdemeanor
and a felony charge in a single accusatory pleading is permissible
within section 954.
8
But Kellett teaches more. It not only permits the joinder of
related misdemeanor and .felony offenses in a single superior court
pleading, it requires such a joinder. Thus, when facts are present
to indicate that a misdemeanor was committed during the same
act or omission as a felony, the district attorney must join the
misdemeanor with the felony if he wishes to prosecute the
misdemeanor. Otherwise, under Kellett, the government would be
5. 63 Cal. 2d at 826-27, 409 P.2d at 208-10, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 369-70 (emphasis
added).
6. 202 Cal. App. 2d 191, 20 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1962). See also In re Williamson, 43
Cal. 2d 651, 276 P.2d 593 (1954) (conspiracy to do an act prohibited by law, but not a
felony, is a misdemeanor over which a superior court has no jurisdiction), and People v.
Ayala, 167 Cal. App. 2d 49, 334 P.2d 61 (1959).
7. 87 Cal. App. 2d 735, 196 P.2d 823 (1948).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1956) reads in part:
An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected
together in their commission, or different -statements of the same offense or
two or more different offenses of the same class of crime or offenses, under
separate counts.
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barred from prosecuting the defendant for either offense if an
acquittal or conviction and sentence had already been rendered on
the other charge.
The Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous court, originally
drafted the third footnote to the Kellett opinion to read:
Section 954 does not distinguish felonies and misdemeanors
in its provisions for joinder. Thus, unless an inferior court is
given exclusive jurisdiction of a misdemeanor, it may be joined
with a felony in one prosecution in the superior court. (People
v. Bundte, 87 Cal. App.2d 735, 744 [197 P.2d 823].) To the
extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion, People v.
Rodriquez, 202 Cal. App. 2d 191 [20 Cal. Rptr. 556], is
disapprovedY
As originally written, the second sentence of the footnote
could mean either, (a) that Kellett interprets section 954 to permit
a misdemeanor to be joined with a felony in a superior court
prosecution unless an inferior court has been given exclusive
jurisdiction of the misdemeanor by virtue of the filing of a
misdemeanor complaint in an inferior court, or (b) that Kellett
interprets section 954 to permit a misdemeanor to be joined with
a felony and prosecuted in the superior court unless an inferior
court has been given exclusive jurisdiction over the misdemeanor
by the legislature.
In order to remove any ambiguity from the original footnote,
the court subsequently modified the second sentence of footnote
three to read: "It [section 954] therefore authorized the joinder of
a misdemeanor and a felony count in a prosecution in the superior
court." 0 In other words, Kellett interprets section 954 to permit
a misdemeanor to be joined with a felony in a superior court
prosecution unless the misdemeanor is separately prosecuted by
the filing of a misdemeanor complaint in an inferior court." Any
9. 63 Cal. 2d at 826,409 P.2d at 209, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
10. Id.
11. That such is the rule is shown by the court's approval of the sweeping language
of Bundte and disapproval of Rodriguez in Kellett. Even assuming that footnote 3 to the
Kellett opinion does not remove the argument set forth above (i.e., that Kellett interprets
section 954 to permit a misdemeanor to be joined with a felony and prosecuted in the
superior court unless an inferior court has been given exclusive jurisdiction over the
misdemeanor by the legislature) this argument or interpretation has no application to
misdemeanors under the general law. Thus municipal courts under CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1462 (Vest 1956), and justice courts under CAL. PENAL CODE § 1425 (\Vest 1956) have
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argument to limit the supreme court's teachings in Kellett to
misdemeanors which because of their penalties, are within the
jurisdiction of the superior court, as was the situation in the
Bundte case, is of no avail; on its facts, the misdemeanor in Kellett
was not within the jurisdiction of the superior court because of its
penalty.
PART II. APPLICATION OF KELLETT'S COMMAND
A. The Speedy Trial Provisions of Section 138212
Kellett interpreted the legislature's intent to permit the
joinder of misdemeanors and felonies under section 954, and
interpreted section 654 to require such a joinder of cases within
its purview. It would follow that the California Supreme Court
and the legislature intended to interpret the constitutional right to
a speedy trial as requiring the trial of a misdemeanor joined with
a felony within 60 days of the filing of an information or finding
of an indictment. If a misdemeanor-felony charge were required
to be tried within 30 days of the filing of a complaint, or within
45 days of a defendant's release on bail, it would defeat Kellett's
command of joinder. Such an interpretation would require a
practical impossibility.
The California Supreme Court and the legislature are
knowledgeable of the normal procedures, proceedings and time
involved in getting a case to trial-within the time permitted for
a speedy trial. They are aware that, in a superior court criminal
case instituted by the filing of an information, it normally
proceeds from the filing of the complaint, arraignment by the
exclusive criminal jurisdiction only as to violations of ordinances in cities or towns situated
within the district in which these inferior courts are established. The legislature has not
given the inferior courts exclusive criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanors under the
general law or under county ordinances.
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1956) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the
action to be dismissed in the following cases:
I. When a person has been held to answer for a public offense and an
information is not filed against him within 15 days thereafter.
2. When a defendant is not brought to trial in a superior court within 60
days after the filing of the indictment, or filing of the information. . ..
3. Regardless of when the complaint is filed, when a defendant in a
misdemeanor case in an inferior court is not brought to trial within 30 days
after he is arraigned . . . or if he has been released on bail or on his own
recognizance, in which case within 45 days after such release.
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magistrate the next day and a preliminary hearing in 10 to 15
days. Then there is a bind over, the filing of an information in
about 14 days, an arraignment on the information in about 14
days, an arraignment on the information in the superior court a
few days later, and a trial on the offenses alleged in the
information within 60 days of its filing. In other words, to avoid
a dismissal, if a misdemeanor joined with a felony in an
information filed in the superior court were to be tried under the
time limits in subdivision 3 of section 1382 (30 days) the superior
court would virtually have to call the case for trial on the date a
defendant is arraigned in the superior court-if it were not already
too late.
A close reading of section 1382 precludes such an
interpretation. It is to be noted that subdivision 1 of that Section
reads "When a person has been held to answer for a public
offense . "..."13 Significantly, the legislature did not use the word
"felony". A misdemeanor is a public offense. Thus, the legislature
used a broader term than it could have if it intended to designate
a type of public offense.
Since sections 954 and 654 have been interpreted as
permitting and requiring the joinder of misdemeanors and felonies
in the superior court, section 1382 must be interpreted as having
been intended to apply subdivisions 1 and 2 to the interpretation
of "speedy trial" in cases where misdemeanors and felonies are
properly joined. In other words, section 1382 must be interpreted
"in the spirit" of the Kellett decision.
Should the prosecution simply not have alleged the
misdemeanor in the original complaint, and then allege it in the
information? If so, what is accomplished? If anything is
accomplished it is a possible disadvantage to a defendant.
Is it not preferable for the prosecution to give a defendant
notice at the earliest opportunity that he will be held to answer
for the commission of a misdemeanor-so his counsel can
conduct his defense accordingly during the preliminary
examination? What if the prosecution did not allege the
misdemeanor in the complaint? The defendant may object to
certain evidence being introduced before the magistrate, which
13. Id. § 1382(1).
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might be relevant to the misdemeanor, but irrelevant to the felony
alleged in the complaint. By failing to include the misdemeanor
in the complaint, but alleging it in the information, the
government would be subjecting itself to a motion under section
99514 to set aside the misdemeanor because of the insufficiency of
the evidence at the preliminary hearing.
The relevant statutory provisions should be read in a manner
which would not require procedural impossibilities. The supreme
court by its decision in Kellett was not creating a procedural trap.
Since an arraignment before a magistrate on a complaint does not
invoke any trial jurisdiction, the speed of the trial, where
misdemeanors are joined with felonies, is governed by subdivisions
1 and 2 of section 1382; subdivision 3 of section 1382 is
inapplicable.
B. Grand Jury and Misdemeanors
It is clear from Kellett, when within the purview of section
654, that misdemeanors and felonies may be joined and
prosecuted in the superior court by an information. However, can
a grand jury return an indictment which joins misdemeanors and
felonies which meets the test of the multiple prosecution
prohibition? On analysis of the relevant sections, when read in the
spirit of Kellett, it appears that there is authority for this.
Kellett holds that the superior court itself has jurisdiction
over a misdemeanor which is joined with a felony. But is there any
bar to the grand jury inquiring into misdemeanor offenses?
Section 91715 presents none, stating that the grand jury may
inquire into "public offenses." Its inquiry is not limited to
felonies. "Public offense" is a broad term which includes both
felonies and misdemeanors." Further, section 917 states that the
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 (West 1956).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 917 (West 1956) which reads: "The grand jury may inquire
into all public offenses committed or triable within the county and present them to the
court by indictment."
16. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 15, 16 (Vest 1956). The legislative authority for the grand
jury to inquire into all public offense (felonies and misdemeanors) is consistent with the
authority and duty which it gave to magistrates conducting preliminary examinations.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (West 1956) requires the magistrate to commit a defendant for
trial if there is sufficient evidence "that a public offense has been committed." (emphasis
added). And if the magistrate is satisfied that a public offense has been committed and
that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant is guilty thereof, CAL. PENAL CODE
19701
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grand jury may present all public offenses, (felonies and
misdemeanors) to the court by an indictment. Therefore, there not
only appears to be authority for the grand jury to inquire into
misdemeanor offenses,1 7 but also authority for misdemeanors to
be charged in an indictment.
C. Grand Jury Procedure When Only a Misdemeanor Is Found
Since felonies and misdemeanors, which are within section
654, may be presented to a superior court by an indictment, what
should be done when the grand jury finds only a misdemeanor?
Should the grand jury present an indictment charging the
misdemeanor alone to a municipal or justice court or must a
complaint be filed?
Under Kellett, a superior court has jurisdiction over
misdemeanor offenses when they are joined with felony offenses
alleged in an information or indictment. If no felony offense is
alleged, it would appear that sections 14251 and 146211 would
place the jurisdiction of the misdemeanor offenses in the inferior
courts.
Section 917 provides that the grand jury is to present its
charges by indictment. There is no specific statutory authority for
the grand jury to return or present a complaint. Section 68220
§ 872 (West 1956) provides that the magistrate "must make . . . an order [committing
the defendant]." (emphasis added). A magistrate cannot discharge a defendant unless,
"after hearing the proofs, it appears either that no public offense has been committed or
that there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty of a public offense . .. .
CAL. PENAL CODE § 871 (West 1956) (emphasis added).
17. A more recent indication that the legislature expressly made misdemeanors
cognizable by grand jury is shown in CAL. PENAL CODE § 496(1) (West Supp. 1968).
Every person who buys or receives any property which has been stolen or has been obtained
in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or
obtained, or who conceals, withholds or aids in concealing or withholding any such
property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, is punishable
by imprisonment in a state prison for not more than 10 years, or in a county jail for not
more than one year; provided, that where the district attorney or the grand jury determines
that such action would be in the intersts of justice, the district attorney or the grand jury,
as the case may be, may, if the value of the property does not exceed two hundred dollars
($200), specify in the accusatory pleading that the offense shall be a misdemeanor,
punishable only by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1425 (West 1956).
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1462 (Vest 1956).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 682 (Vest 1956) provides:
Every public offense must be prosecuted by indictment or information except:
I. Where proceedings are had for the removal of civil officers of the state;
19701 KELLETT'S COMMAND
provides, with certain exceptions, that all public offenses must be
prosecuted by indictment or information; one exception is
regarding public offenses tried in inferior courts. At this point
section 74021 comes into play.
It could be argued that a grand jury finding only a
misdemeanor could present such public offense to the inferior
court by indictment under the authority of section 917. This
pleading would be within the language of section 740, which
requires that a prosecution in inferior courts be initiated by
complaints "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law." Such a
construction of the two sections would harmonize under the
teachings of Kellett.
22
However, even if this argument were not accepted there
would not appear to be a bar for a member of the grand jury (e.g.
its foreman) signing a verified complaint on information and
belief based on the evidence presented to the grand jury, after the
grand jury votes that a misdemeanor should be presented, and
then filing the complaint in the appropriate inferior court. 3 This
procedure would result in the familiar complaint being filed in the
inferior courts, and permit the usual criminal procedures to be
followed thereafter, without the confusion which might result
from having indictments filed in the inferior courts.
2. Offenses arising in the militia when in actual service, and in the land
and naval forces in the time of war, or which the State may keep, with the
consent of Congress, in time of peace.
3. Offenses tried in municipal and justice courts;
4. All misdemeanors of which jurisdiction has been conferred upon
superior courts sitting as juvenile courts;
5. A felony to which the defendant has pleaded guilty to the complaint
before a magistrate, where permitted by law.
21. CAL: PENAL CODE § 740 (West 1956) states: "Except as otherwise provided by
law, all public offenses triable in the inferior courts must be prosecuted by written
complaint under oath subscribed by the complainant. Such complaint may be verified on
information and belief."
22. According to CAL. PENAL CODE § 889 (West Supp. 19683, "[an indictment is
an accusation in writing presented by the grand jury to a competent court, charging a
person with a public offense." Thus, an indictment is not restricted to felonies; it may
charge "public offenses." Why shouldn't the grand jury present an indictment charging a
misdemeanor (a public offense) to an inferior court since under section 1425 and 1462 an
inferior court would be competent over misdemeanors?
23. The foreman of the grand jury or a competent peace officer could prepare and
sign an affidavit or declaration in support of a warrant for arrest if one is necessary, i.e.,
if the defendant is not already in custody.
This same procedure could be followed when the grand jury determined that a
misdemeanor should be filed under subdivision I of section 496, note 17 supra.
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However, on balance, the practice which would appear to be
the better of the two would be for the grand jury to present an
indictment to the inferior court. No great violence is done to the
relevant sections in adopting this practice.24 Although it might at
first be somewhat shocking to have indictments presented to
inferior courts, if the idea is accepted rather than resisted, there
is no reason why it cannot work. Furthermore, if an indictment
is presented-rather than a complaint filed-there would be some
authority to provide the defendant with a transcript of the
proceedings before the grand jury, which culminated in his being
charged by the grand jury with a misdemeanor.
25
D. Procedure Before a Magistrate
Assuming the prosecution has filed a complaint with a
magistrate charging a felony and a misdemeanor, and the time for
the preliminary examination has arrived, one of four results may
be had"
First, the magistrate might find that the evidence failed to
show the commission of any public offense, or that there is not
sufficient evidence to believe the defendant guilty of any public
offenses. In such a case, the'defendant is discharged under section
871,21 and, for the purpose of this article the matter is at an end.
Second, the magistrate might find that both a felony offense
and a misdemeanor offense had been committed and that there is
sufficient evidence to believe the defendant guilty of both offenses.
Or third, the magistrate might find that .only the felony offense
had been committed, or that there is sufficient evidence to believe
the defendant guilty of only the felony offense. Fourth, the
magistrate might find that only the misdemeanor offense had been
committed, or that there is sufficient evidence to believe the
defendant guilty of only the misdemeanor offense.
24. See note 22 supra.
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1 (West 1956) authorizes the reporter to transcribe the
proceedings conducted before the grand jury only when an indictment or accusation is
presented against a defendant. If the grand jury foreman were to file a complaint on behalf
of the grand jury, no indictment or accusation would have been presented. On the other
hand, by presenting an indictment, albeit one presented to an inferior court charging a
misdemeanor, (he defendant would have a basis to demand a transcript of the proceedings;
this would put an indicted misdemeanor on an equal footing with a defendant who is held
to answer a misdemeanor charge after a preliminary examination, treated infra.
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 871 (fVest 1956).
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I. Procedure if magistrate finds a felony only or a felony and a
misdemeanor.
If the magistrate should find that the felony offense alleged
in the complaint was committed and that there is sufficient
evidence to believe the defendant guilty thereof-the procedure is
the same as it was before Kellett. Namely, the defendant is held
to answer on the felony offense, 27 he is committed, 28 and the
magistrate forwards all documents and matters pertaining to the
case to the superior court.29 An information would then be filed
in the superior court 0 within fifteen days after the defendant's
commitment.31 The information would allege that the defendant
had committed the felony;32 pretrial and trial procedures would
then follow in the superior court.
If the magistrate should find that both the felony and the
misdemeanor had been committed and that there was sufficient
evidence to believe the defendant guilty of both offenses, the
procedure is basically the same as that followed when the
defendant was held to answer only on the felony offense. However,
the magistrate should hear and consider evidence relative to the
misdemeanor offense.3 3 More clearly, the magistrate should not
close his eyes to all but felony offenses; he has the authority and
duty to hear evidence as to all public offenses.34 The magistrate
should think simply in terms of public offenses, considering
evidence as to all of those alleged in the complaint.
2. Procedure if magistrate finds only a misdemeanor offense
This brings us to the case wherein the magistrate finds only
that a misdemeanor offense has been committed or the evidence
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (Vest 1956).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 873-877a (West 1956).
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 883 (West 1956).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 737, 738 (West 1956).
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 739 (West 1956).
32. Id. In this particular instance, the district attorney, if he believes the evidence
before the magistrate showed that the misdemeanor had been committed and that the
evidence was sufficient to believe the defendant guilty thereof, could under section 739
allege the misdemeanor count in the information even though the magistrate did not hold
the defendant to answer on that count. But this is not the subject of this review.
33. See People v. McKerney, 257 Cal. App. 2d 64, 69-70, 64 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617-18
(1967).
34. See note 43 infra.
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is sufficient to believe that the defendant is only guilty of a
misdemeanor offense. In such a case, People v. Hardin35 provides
the procedural answer:
If the felony count is dismissed . . . the magistrate at the
termination of the preliminary [examination] on motion of the
People or the defendant or on his own motion . . . should
order the defendant arraigned in the municipal court and a
trial date fixed on the misdemeanor count. 6
In effect, the magistrate holds the defendant to answer on the
misdemeanor offense, commits him for such purposes, and binds
him over to the inferior court.37 The magistrate has authority to
admit such a defendant to bail.38 If the magistrate sets a date and
time for the defendant to appear in municipal or justice court for
arraignment on a misdemeanor complaint 'as he would do in his
order of commitment, to be held to answer, and to be arraigned
on an information filed in the superior court) the usual pretrial
and trial procedures can be followed in the inferior court.39
It.would appear that a defendant would not have a valid basis
to complain about this procedure. Indeed, section 86940 and 87011
35. 256 Cal. 2d 954, 64 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1967).
36. Id. at 961, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
37. The magistrate would transfer all documents relating to the case to the
appropriate inferior court. CAL. PENAL CODE § 883 (West 1956).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1277 (West 1956), provides that: "When the defendant has
been held to answer upon an examination for a public offense, the admission to bail may
be by the magistrate by whom he is so held, or by any magistrate who has power to issue
the writ of habeas corpus."
39. At this point, the defendant's right to a speedy trial as set forth in CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1382(3) (West 1956), would, for the first time, commence to run. See People v.
McKerney, 257 Cal. App. 2d 64. 70, 64 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617 (1967), and People v. Hardin,
256 Cal. App. 2d 954, 961-62, 64 Cal. Rptr. 307, 312 (1967).
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 869 (West 1956), in pertinent part, reads as follows:
[Delivery of transcript by county clerk.] Sixth-In every case in which a
transcript is filed as provided in this section, the county clerk shall deliver the
original of said transcript so filed with him to the district attorney immediately
upon his receipt thereof and shall deliver a copy of said transcript to each
defendant (other than a fictitious defendant) at least five days before trial or
upon earlier demand by him without cost to him; provided, however, that if
any defendant be held to answer to two or more charges upon the same
examination and thereafter the district attorney shall file separate informations
upon said several charges, the delivery to each such defendant of one copy of
the transcript of said examination shall be a compliance with this section as
to all of said informations.
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 870 (West 1956) provides:
The magistrate or his clerk must keep the depositions taken on the information
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would give such a defendant a basis to demand that he be
furnished with a transcript of the preliminary examination which
culminated in his being held to answer on the misdemeanor
offense.
Nor would the prosecution have a valid basis to complain
about this procedure. Although the prosecution might disagree
with the magistrate that the evidence failed to show the
commission of a felony offense or that the evidence was sufficient
to believe the defendant guilty of 2 felony offenses, the government
need not file the misdemeanor complaint in the inferior court; it
could refile a felony-misdemeanor complaint with a magistrate or
it could take the matter before the grand jury.
2
E. Proceeding Under Section 995
The next consideration is: What is to be done in the event the
defendant should bring a motion under section 995 to set aside
either or both misdemeanor or felony counts, as alleged in the
pleading?
There does not appear to be any authority under section 995
to treat the misdemeanor count as alleged in the information or
indictment any differently than the felony count." Nor does there
appear to be any valid reason why the offenses should be treated
differently. Thus, if on a motion under section 995 the superior
court were to rule that the evidence is insufficient to support the
or the examination, until they are returned to the proper court; and must not
permit them to be examined or copied by any person except a judge of a court
having jurisdiction of the offense, or authorized to issue writs of habeas
corpus, the attorney general, district attorney, or other prosecuting attorney,
and the defendant and his counsel; provided however, upon demand by
defendant or his attorney the magistrate must order a transcript of the
depositions taken on the information, or on the examination, to be
immediately furnished said defendant or his attorney, after the commitment
of said defendant as provided by sections 876 and 877 of this code.
42. The misdemeanor offense could be reconsidered in either of the subsequent
proceedings since it would not be dismissed (cf., section 1387), assuming the pleading,
alleging the misdemeanor offense, is filed in a court of competent trial jurisdiction within
one year after the commission of the misdemeanor offense. CAL. PENAL CODE § 801 (West
1956).
43. That the misdemeanor count is probably subject to a motion under section 995,
is another reason why the magistrate conducting a preliminary examination should permit
evidence relevant to the misdemeanor offense to be heard. If the misdemeanor was not
necessarily shown by the very evidence that showed the felony offense, the misdemeanor
count would be vulnerable to a motion to set it aside under section 995.
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misdemeanor count and therefore to set aside that count, the
defendant would proceed to stand trial in the superior court on
the felony count.44
A different problem is created under section 995 if the
superior court should set aside the felony offense as alleged in the
information or indictment, thereby leaving only a misdemeanor
count. By having set aside the felony, there no longer is a joinder
of a misdemeanor which, under Kellett, was the basis for giving
the superior court jurisdiction to try the misdemeanor offense.
Therefore, by virtue of the order setting aside the felony, sections
1425 and 1462 (giving the inferior courts jurisdiction in
misdemeanors) would become operative. It could be argued that
the superior court retains jurisdiction to try the misdemeanor,
since it initially had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
person when the defendant was arraigned on the information as
originally filed.
But, if it were determined that it would be preferable to try
the misdemeanor count in an inferior court, upon proper request,
the superior court could order that the misdemeanor count be
transferred to the appropriate inferior court under section
1462.2.11 Here, the application of section 1462.2 would appear to
44. This assumes that the prosecution did not take an appeal from the superior
court's order setting aside the misdemeanor count. Such an order would be appealable by
the prosecution (section 1238, subd. I); as the prosecution can take an appeal from an
order under section 995 setting aside one count of a multiple count information or
indictment. People v. Agnello, 259 Cal. App. 2d 785, 789, 66 Cal. Rptr. 571, 573 (1968).
It also assumes the defendant did not obtain a writ of prohibition under section 999a based
on the superior court's refusal to also order the setting aside of the felony count.
If the prosecution did not reinstate the misdemeanor count by prosecuting a successful
appeal from the superior court's setting it aside under section 995, section 654, as
construed by Kellett, would bar a subsequent prosecution of the defendant for the alleged
commission of that misdemeanor offense.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1462.2 (West 1956), as amended (Supp. 1968) reads as
follows:
Except as otherwise provided in the Vehicle Code, the proper court for the trial
of criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor shall be determined as follows:
If there is a municipal or justice court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter
of the case, established in the district within which the offense charged was
committed, such court is the proper court for the trial of the case; otherwise,
the court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter, nearest to the place where
the offense was committed is the proper court for the trial of the case.
If an action or proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction
of the subject matter thereof other than the court herein designated as the
proper court for the trial, the action may, notwithstanding, be tried in the
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require a liberal construction. However, such a construction could
be justified by the harmonizing of all relevant sections which is
required by Kellett. 6
Alternatively, the superior court might dismiss the
misdemeanor count on the ground that under sections 1425 and
1462 (and in the light of its order under section 995 setting aside
the felony count) it no longer has jurisdiction. However, this
procedure would probably be resisted by the prosecution; it would
be fearful that by having dismissed the misdemeanor count,
section 138711 would then bar any subsequent prosecution for the
misdemeanor offense. On the other hand, a close reading of
section 1387 would not appear to bar a subsequent prosecution for
the misdemeanor; the dismissal would be based upon the lack of
jurisdiction of the superior court, and not a "dismissal . . . as
provided in [the chapter of the Penal Code in which Section 1387
is codified]." 48
Some courts might deem the use of section 1462.2 in the
premises as stretching the language of that statute beyond
recognition. Also, the prosecution may resist a dismissal under
section 1387 (at least until there is definitive authority that it
court where commenced unless the defendant, at the time he pleads, requests
an order transferring the action or proceeding to the proper court. If after such
request it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the
proper court, the court shall order the action or proceeding transferred to the
proper court. The judge must, at the time of arraignment, inform the defendant
of his right to be tried in the district wherein the offense was committed.
46. See People v. McKerney, 257 Cal. App. 2d 64, 69, 64 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617 (1967).
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1387 (West 1956) reads: "'An order for the dismissal of the
action, made as provided in this chapter, is a bar to any other prosecution for the same
offense if it is a misdemeanor, but not if it is a felony."
48. Section 1387 is found in Chapter 8 of Title 10 of Part 2 of the Penal Code.
Chapter 8 contains sections 1381, 1381.5, 1382, 1383, 1384, 1385, 1386, and 1387. Since
the defendant in the case posed under this heading is not in a state prison, a jail within
this state or a federal prison on a charge unrelated to the one or ones which are the subject
of the instant action, sections 1381 and 1382 are inapplicable. Since the defendant would
not have been denied a speedy trial on the misdemeanor count at the point of time posed
in our case section 1382 would be inapplicable. Nor would sections 1383, 1384 or 1386 have
any application in the premises. Since the superior court can not dismiss an action under
section 1385 if the grounds for the dismissal were cognizable by demurrer, section 1385
would be inapplicable since a demurrer in our case would lie. Therefore, since there would
be no provision in Chapter 8 to permit the dismissal of the misdemeanor in our case,
section 1387 would not be a bar to a subsequent prosecution of the defendant for that
offense.
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
would not operate as a bar to a subsequent misdemeanor
prosecution). For these reasons the better practice may be for the
defendant to file a demurrer to the information or indictment in
the superior court. If no demurrer is forthcoming, the court may
handle the matter on its own motion.
Thus, after the superior court has granted the defendant's
motion under section 995 and has ordered the felony count set
aside, the only charge remaining is the misdemeanor offense. The
superior court would then be without jurisdiction by virtue of
sections 1425 and 1462.
The defendant could then properly bring a demurrer under
subdivisions 1 or 5 of section 1004.11 Of course, the defendant
would have to move for and be granted permission to withdraw
any previously entered pleas for the purpose of bringing his
demurrer.
A demurrer would appear to be an acceptable solution for the
prosecution. The granting of a demurrer is an appealable order for
the government." Therefore, the prosecution would have its full
array of remedies: (a) it could appeal the order under section 995
setting aside the felony count; (b) it could file a new felony-
misdemeanor complaint with a magistrate by granting the
defendant's demurrer and not filing a misdemeanor complaint in
an inferior court; (c) it could take the complaint before the grand
jury. The defendant would still be subject to a prosecution for the
misdemeanor offense if it were warranted by the evidence and not
barred by the statute of limitations.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1004(l) and (5) (West 1956) provides:
The defendant may demur to the accusatory pleading at any time prior to the
entry of a plea, when it appears upon the face thereof either:
1. If an indictment, that the grand jury by which it was found had no
legal authority to inquire into the offense charged, or, if an information or
complaint that the court has no jurisdiction of the offense charged therein;
5. That it contains matter which, if true, would constitute a legal
justification or excuse of the offense charged, or other legal bar to the
prosecution.
If in the given case the prosecution was brought by an information, subdivision I
would be a good ground for a demurrer. But if it were brought by an indictment, this
subdivision would not be good, for, as was shown earlier, a grand jury does have legal
authority to inquire into misdemeanor offenses. Therefore, if the case was initiated by
indictment, subdivision 5 would have to be used on the theory that since the indictment
alleges only a misdemeanor sections 1425 and 1462 are a "legal bar" to the prosecution
of the offense in the superior court.
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1238(2) (Vest 1956).
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F. Proceedings Under Section 1538.551
Once an information or indictment has been filed in the
superior court which alleges a felony and misdemeanor, a
defendant may brirfg a pretrial motion to suppress evidence under
section 1538.5. In such motions to suppress, no particular count
in the pleading need be the object of the motion. But a ruling on
the motion to suppress may bar a prosecution of one or more of
the charges alleged in the pleading. Hence, the superior court's
ruling on a motion to suppress evidence can have a result similar
to rulings under section 995.
If the superior court were to suppress all of the prosecution's
evidence, the result would be no different than in any other case;
the misdemeanor-felony pleading under Kellett presents no
unusual problem. Similarly, if the motion to suppress were denied
as to any of the prosecution's evidence, the result would be no
different in a Kellett pleading than in any other case.
But, in suppressing only a part of the evidence in the
possession of the prosecution, the result can be that there no
longer remains sufficient evidence in the hands of the Government
to support a prosecution on either the misdemeanor count or the
felony count." If the prosecution no longer has sufficient evidence
to support the misdemeanor charge, the felony charge would
remain in the jurisdiction of the superior court. The trial date
which had been set, presumably, at the defendant's superior court
arraignment, would stand. Therefore, if the government wished to
have appellate review of the court's ruling suppressing evidence,
it should file a notice of intention to file a petition for a writ of
prohibition or mandate in the court of appeal. Then, such petition
should be filed in a timely manner. 3 If the prosecution did not
51. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West Supp. 1968).
52. It is, of course, conceivable that though only part of the evidence is suppressed
there nonetheless would be insufficient evidence to support a prosecution in any of the
courts. But such a ruling is tantamount to the type previously referred to, Le., where all
the evidence is suppressed. Thus, in any such cases, the prosecution would be seeking
appellate review by extraordinary writ or by appeal of the whole case.
53. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(o) (West Supp. 1968). This procedure would stay
trial of the felony until the court of appeal ruled on the prosecution's petition. It would
have the effect of keeping the case in one piece. If the superior court's order were affirmed,
the trial proceeds on the felony only. If the superior court's order were reversed, the trial
'would proceed in both the misdemeanor and felony as the prosecution would again have
all of its evidence.
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intend to seek appellate review of the superior court's order
suppressing some of the evidence, the simplest procedure would be
to so inform the superior court; at the same time it could inform
the court that there no longer is sufficient evidence to support a
prosecution of the defendant for the misdemeanor offense. On its
own motion, the superior court could then properly dismiss the
misdemeanor count.
5 4
In the event the superior court's ruling on the motion to
suppress results in the prosecution no longer having sufficient
evidence to support the felony charge, with the misdemeanor still
standing, the matter would appear to be more properly within the
jurisdiction of an inferior court.5 In these cases, as distinguished
from orders entered under section 995, the felony count
technically remains in the pleading and the matter remains within
the jurisdiction of the superior court. If the district attorney does
not intend to seek appellate review of the ruling on the motion to
suppress evidence,5 the simplest procedure would be for him to so
inform the superior court. He should also inform the court that
there is no longer sufficient evidence to support a prosecution of
the defendant for the felony offense; the superior court could then
properly, on its own motions dismiss the felony count.57
With the dismissal of the felony count, the case would be
placed in substantially the same posture as would be a case where
the felony count had been set aside under section 995. As
discussed above, the defendant could then request the
misdemeanor to be transferred to the appropriate inferior court
under section 1462.2. The misdemeanor could be dismissed on the
ground that the offense is within the jurisdiction of an inferior
court under sections 1425 and 1462, and the prosecution could
then file a misdemeanor complaint in the appropriate inferior
court;" or, having requested and having been granted permission
54. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1385, 1538.5(j) (West Supp. 1968).
55. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1425, 1462 (\vest 1956). See text accompanying note 45,
supra.
56. If the prosecution intended to seek such a review, as in the situation where the
superior court only suppressed the evidence which supported the misdemeanor count, the
prosecution should file a notice of intention to file a petition for a writ of prohibition or
mandate in the court of appeal and then file such a petition in a timely manner. See also,
note 53 supra.
57. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1385, 1538.5(j) (Vest Supp, 1968).
58. See note 48 supra, for the proposition that such a dismissal would not be a bar
to a subsequent prosecution of the defendant for the misdemeanor offense. Recall that in
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to withdraw his previously entered pleas, the defendant, for the
same reasons as discussed under the problems arising under
section 995, could demur to complaint under subdivisions I and
5 of section 1004. If the defendant's demurrer were granted, the
prosecution could then file a misdemeanor complaint in the
appropriate inferior court.
G. Pleas Entered Before a Magistrate
One word of caution should be given to the taking of pleas
of guilty by a magistrate. The caveat applies when a defendant
wishes to enter a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor charged in the
complaint filed with the magistrate, and the district attorney then
moves to dismiss the felony count (or the defendant is otherwise
discharged from the felony count).
In People v. Hardin the court remarked:
It would seem that once a defendant is charged with a
felony and a misdemeanor in the same complaint, arising out
of the same act or set of circumstances, the magistrate must
hear the matter at a preliminary hearing. He must advise the
defendant of his rights [citations omitted] which advice does
not include, of course, an arraignment, and does not include
advising the defendant of his rights to a jury trial, a speedy
trial and the trial date. Such procedure must be distinguished
from an arraignment for trial. It is clear that an appearance
before a magistrate doei not invoke trial court jurisdiction.-9
Hence, a defendant who is before a magistrate has not been
arraigned by a court on the charges alleged in the complaint. In
the absence of an arraignment, a valid judgment cannot be entered
in a criminal case.
60
Furthermore, a "magistrate" is not a "court"-inferior or
otherwise;6 the magistrate is a creature of statute." There is no
this situation it would be the felony-not the misdemeanor-which had been dismissed
under section 138.5.
59. 256 Cal. App. 2d at 961, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
8 60. See People v. Gaines, 52 Cal. 479 (1877) and People v. Corbett, 28 Cal. 328
(1865).
61. A judge who sits as a magistrate does not carry his court or his judicial attributes
with him except to the extent that they inhere in the office of magistrate. Amos v. Superior
Court, 182 Cal. App. 2d 343, 6 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1960). Whatever the inherent powers of
courts from which a magistrate comes to conduct a preliminary examination may be, those
powers do not inhere in him while he is acting as a magistrate. Fursdon v. Los Angeles
County, 100 Cal. App. 2d 845, 223 P.2d 520 (1950).
62. People v. Brite, 9 Cal. 2d 666, 683, 72 P.2d 122, 131 (1937); People v. Cohen,
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statutory authority for a magistrate to render a judgment, grant
probation, etc., in a criminal case.13 Since a defendant who pled
guilty to a misdemeanor offense before a judge of an inferior
court, (acting as a magistrate) would not have been arraigned in
a trial court, no trial court jurisdiction could have been invoked
in the premises; the magistrate would have no authority to render
a judgment in the case. Such a plea would be a nullity.
Yet, it is not uncommon for a defendant to plead guilty to a
misdemeanor in a felony-misdemeanor complaint, which is before
a magistrate for a preliminary examination, and after his plea the
defendant is discharged from the felony. In such cases, the
prosecution should file a misdemeanor complaint in the
appropriate inferior court. This can be with the same judge who
is acting as a magistrate on the felony-misdemeanor complaint,
i.e., the judge can take off his magistrate's hat. At that point, the
defendant can be duly arraigned on the misdemeanor complaint.
The judge can then proceed to act as the circumstances of the case
warrant; the defendant can plead guilty to the charge and a valid
judgment can be rendered by the judge. After the defendant has
pled guilty to the charge alleged in the misdemeanor complaint,
the judge can then put on his magistrate's hat and on the motion
of the prosecution or because of a lack of evidence (no evidence
having been produced and the prosecution having rested), he may,
as a magistrate, discharge the defendant from the charges pending
before him.
There is, however, one exception to the above procedure.
With the 1969 amendment to section 17 of the Penal Code," a
case may arise wherein the magistrate has found that the felony
charge pending before him should be a misdemeanor. In such a
case, both parties may consent to this charge being made a
misdemeanor. Yet the district attorney may not want to accept a
plea of guilty to the misdemeanor with the understanding that the
defendant be discharged from the felony charge. 5
118 Cal. 74, 78, 50 P. 20, 21 (1897); People v. Swain, 5 Cal. App. 421, 425, 90 P. 720,
722 (1907).
63. The one exception will be discussed infra.
64. See note 45 supra, and accompanying test.
65. Such a case may arise. The felony charged might be a violation of CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261(1) (West 1956) (statutory rape), which can be made a misdemeanor by
sentence (CAL. PENAL CODE § 264) (vest 1956). The misdemeanor alleged as such might
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If the defendant then pled guilty to the felony which the
magistrate determined to be a misdemeanor and the district
attorney dismissed the misdemeanor alleged as such in the
complaint, the magistrate would appear to have jurisdiction to
accept the plea and to render a judgment in the case. Section 17
of the Penal Code would appear to give the magistrate authority
to do this. Therefore, in this limited situation, the prosecutor
would not have to file a new misdemeanor complaint in an
inferior court but could proceed on the original felony-
misdemeanor complaint which had been filed with the
magistrate.6
CONCLUSION
The supreme court's command in Kellett has drastically
changed the pleading practices in criminal actions. All concerned
with such practices and procedures must adjust their thinking.
Problems appear when the Kellett rule (that a misdemeanor
charge must be joined with a felony charge when they arise out
of same act or omission) is applied to a system accustomed to the
simple rule that all felonies are tried in superior court and
misdemeanors in inferior courts. However, these problems are not
insurmountable. Some practical solutions have been offered
herein. If these problems are analyzed and all statutory provisions
are interpreted in the spirit of Kellett, a workable system will
evolve.
be a violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1956) (battery), a misdemeanor [CAL.
PENAL CODE § 243 (West 1956)]. While the district attorney may agree that the statutory
rape charge should under the facts be made a misdemeanor he may prefer that the
defendant stand convicted of an offense which more closely describes the facts of the case
rather than having the defendant stand convicted of a more ambiguous misdemeanor.
Similarly, the defendant may be willing to plead guilty to the same statutory rape charge
knowing it will be made a misdemeanor rather than risk a conviction for the same offense
with the possibility that it would remain a felony.
66. For administrative purposes, the municipal or justice court judge acting as a
magistrate may well wish to change the number on this complaint so that it would
thereafter be filed and indexed as a misdemeanor complaint.
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